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ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LA w. By Mary A. Glendon. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1987. Pp. 197. $25. 
Both abortion and divorce have been extensively analyzed in legal 
literature, in other scholarly literature, and in popular writings as well. 
A new perspective on these subjects may seem elusive. Yet Mary Ann 
Glendon, 1 in Abortion and Divorce in Western Law, offers a thought-
ful, and thought-provoking comparative legal analysis that provides 
fresh insight on these two topics. 
Chapters 1 and 2 of this book provide comparative surveys of abor-
tion and divorce law in the United States, Canada, and eighteen other 
Western countries.2 In the third and final chapter, Glendon attempts 
to explain why American law differs from that of other Western coun-
tries, and focuses on the evolution of political and legal ideas as one 
part of the explanation of America's distinctiveness. 
The author approaches her comparative analysis of abortion and 
divorce from the perspective of what she terms the rhetorical method 
of law-making. In European thinking, she says, law is viewed as an 
educational tool. This contrasts with English and American legal the-
ory which "den[ies] or downplay[s] any pedagogical aim of law."3 
Glendon is concerned with both the interpretive and the constitutive 
aspects of the rhetorical activity of the law. "Law is interpretive when 
it is engaged in converting social facts into legal data and systemati-
cally summarizing them in legal language. . . . Law is constitutive 
when legal language and legal concepts begin to affect ordinary lan-
guage and to influence the manner in which we perceive reality" (p. 9). 
In the first chapter of her book, Glendon analyzes the interpretive 
and constitutive aspects of abortion regulation in twenty Western 
countries.4 Her inquiry is aimed at examining "the messages about 
1. Mary Ann Glendon is Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. Professor Glendon has 
written extensively in the areas of comparative and family law. Her books include M. GLEN· 
DON, M. GORDON & C. 0SAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS AND 
CASES ON THE CIVIL LAW, COMMON LAW AND SOCIALIST LAW TRADITIONS (1985), M. 
GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981), and M. GLENDON, STATE, 
LAW AND FAMILY: FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN 
EUROPE (1977). 
2. The Western countries surveyed are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England, Finland, 
France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and West Germany. 
3. P. 8. Glendon credits two American scholars, James Boyd White and Clifford Geertz, 
with recognizing the importance of the rhetorical activity of law. See White, Law as Rhetoric, 
Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1985); C. 
GEERTZ, LoCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER EssAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983). 
See also J.B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: EssAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 
(1985). 
4. The author provides a detailed description of current abortion laws in these countries 
(except Belgium and Ireland) in the Appendices. Pp. 145-57. For another, more detailed discus-
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such important matters as life and liberty, individual autonomy and 
dependency, that are being communicated both expressly and implic-
itly by abortion regulation" (p. 15). Although seventeen of these 
twenty countries abandoned strict abortion laws in the last two de-
cades, abortion is subject to less regulation in the United States than in 
any other country in the world. The French abortion statute, which 
specifies the underlying issue as one involving human life, is contrasted 
with the American view of the issue as a conflict between a woman's 
individual liberty or privacy and a nonperson (p. 19). European coun-
tries have tried to prevent abortion from becoming routine by discour-
aging the establishment of specialized abortion clinics. The United 
States Supreme Court has struck down hospitalization requirements as 
a burden on the pregnant woman's freedom of choice, 5 and a vast 
profit-making industry has grown up around abortion. 
Glendon acknowledges that the philosophical differences she iden-
tifies may be partially due to the fact that the development of Euro-
pean abortion policy takes place in the give-and-take of the legislative 
process rather than through court-imposed limitations on regulation 
(p. 25). Yet she notes that important differences emerge even between 
Roe v. Wade 6 and European court decisions on abortion. The West 
German abortion statute was challenged and struck down by the West 
German Constitutional Court in 1975.7 However, the West German 
court left room for the West German legislature to revise abortion pol-
icy, recognized that human life was at stake, and emphasized commu-
nitarian values. In contrast, Roe and its progeny have virtually 
eliminated legislative action on abortion, failed to recognize the fetus 
as either human or alive, and emphasized individualistic values. 8 
Relying on her comparison of American and European abortion 
law, Glendon addresses two misconceptions commonly held in the 
United States. The first misconception is that the present legal situa-
tion in the United States with respect to abortion is not unusual, and 
the second is that compromise on this issue is not possible (p. 40). 
sion of the formation of abortion law, and its current application in the United Kingdom, Can· 
ada, West Germany, France, and Italy, as well as the United States, see ABORTION LAW AND 
PUBLIC POLICY (D. Campbell ed. 1984). 
5. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 201 (1973); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 431-38 (1983); Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 
481-82 (1983). 
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
7. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, 39 BVerfGE 1. For an English translation of the decision, see 
Jonas & Gorby, West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 J. MARSHALL J. 
OF PRAC. & PROC. 605 (1976). 
8. For further elaboration on the differences between the American and German abortion 
decisions, see Jonas & Gorby, supra note 7; Kommers, Liberty and Community in Constitutional 
Law: The Abortion Cases in Comparative Perspective, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV. 371 (focusing on 
American and German abortion jurisprudence, and the tension between liberty and community 
in the abortion issue). 
1406 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1404 
Glendon argues that the abortion issue should be left to the state legis-
latures. She notes that nineteen states liberalized their abortion laws 
between 1967 and 1973, and concludes that if the issue were returned 
to the states, the great majority would move to the moderate position 
exhibited by most of the European countries. For Glendon, this is the 
ideal solution. 
The idea of returning the abortion debate to the state legislatures 
makes Glendon appear a pro-life advocate. But Glendon's message is 
a different one. Europeans have resolved the abortion debate without 
the polarity and violence still prevalent in the United States. Glendon 
is searching for a method to build a similar consensus in America, and 
to temper continued extremism. 
The author does recognize that there are flaws in her solution, such 
as the inadequacy of the representation of women in state legislatures, 
and she does not satisfactorily address these problems. She also does 
not discuss the possibility that it is the very philosophical differences 
which she identifies as distinctly American, the traditional emphasis 
on freedom and individual rights, that may make compromise on 
abortion in this country impossible. Although the book is primarily 
characterized by thoughtful, even-handed analysis,9 Glendon presents 
hypothetical criticisms from her pro-choice and pro-life friends to her 
solution to the abortion problem and sanctimoniously dismisses them 
(pp. 59-62). Yet Glendon's comparative analysis demonstrates that a 
divided society can compromise on the abortion issue. 
In chapter 2, Glendon compares divorce laws in Western countries 
noting that divorce, like abortion, has become more readily available 
in the last twenty years. Between 1969 and 1985, divorce law in nearly 
every Western country was profoundly altered. These changes were 
characterized by the recognition or expansion of no-fault grounds for 
divorce, and by the acceptance or simplification of divorce by mutual 
consent. 
Glendon's emphasis is on how and why divorce law in the United 
States differs from divorce law in other countries. In most of the 
United States, in Sweden, and since 1986, in Canada, the legal defini-
tion of marriage is that of a relationship terminable at will. Other 
European countries have officially maintained the idea of marriage as 
an enduring relationship invoking reciprocal rights and obligations. 
Glendon sees American divorce as "no-responsibility" divorce (p. 
9. This even-handedness contrasts with the majority of existing abortion literature, which is 
decidedly either pro-choice or pro-life. See, e.g., ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES 
xvii (S. Callahan & D. Callahan eds. 1984) (in choosing essays for this book, the editors "sought 
a group equally divided between prolife and prochoice"); Luker, Abortion and the Meaning of 
Life, in ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES 25, 26 (S. Callahan & D. Callahan eds. 
1984) ("Abortion polarizes."); KRASON, ABORTION: POLITICS, MORALITY AND THE CoNSTITU· 
TION 1 (1984) (claiming that there is no neutral position on abortion). 
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105). She is concerned with the effect of "the ideological aspects of 
divorce law on the way people think and feel about marriage" (p. 109). 
The greatest practical difference between American and European 
divorce, Glendon notes, is an economic one. In continental Europe, 
child support is calculated in a predictable fashion, and community 
property, in principle, is divided equally. Judges determine the 
amount of child support through formulas or standardized support 
tables that are designed to calculate a realistic amount, given the needs 
of the child and the resources of the parents. European countries also 
have a better record of enforcing collection of child support payments. 
Additionally, some European countries partially absorb collection fail-
ures by advancing funds to the custodial parent and collecting directly 
from the noncustodial debtor parent. 
In contrast, American and English statutes give great discretion to 
judges for allocating marital property and assessing child support. 
Glendon asserts that the uncertainty of the Anglo-American system 
deprives spouses of any clear principles to set the parameters for nego-
tiation. This is especially important because settlement is the prevail-
ing method of finalizing marital dissolution in the United States. 
When a case actually reaches a judge, the judge typically greatly un-
derestimates the costs of raising a child (p. 87). Thus, the expense of 
raising a child falls disproportionately on the custodial parent, usually 
the mother. 10 
Glendon argues that the economic consequences of divorce, under 
American law, should take a different form when children are in-
volved.11 The author advocates that a "children first" principle gov-
ern such divorces (p. 94). Under such an approach, all of the marital 
property would be subject to the duty to provide for the children. 
Under Glendon's theory, "the judge's main task would be to piece 
together, from property and income and in-kind personal care, the 
best possible package to meet the needs of the children and their physi-
cal custodian" (p. 95). Glendon's solution seems ideal, but she does 
not address the political viability of putting such a standard in place. 12 
The third and final chapter of Abortion and Divorce in Western 
Law tries to explain why America's abortion and divorce law is subtly, 
yet profoundly, different from that of other Western countries. Glen-
don reaches back to the philosophical theories and theorists that 
10. For a detailed description of the extent of this problem, see generally L. WEITZMAN, THE 
DIVORCE REVOLUTION - THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND EcONOMlC CONSEQUENCES FOR 
WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 264-356 (1985). 
11. Other scholars have also argued that greater weight should be given to the interests of 
children when property is distributed in divorce proceedings. See J. EEKELAAR & M. 
MACLEAN, MAINTENANCE AFfER DIVORCE 104-34 (1986). 
12. Cf. R. NEELY, THE DIVORCE DECISION: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF 
ENDING A MARRIAGE 188 (1984) ("It is possible to create a competent and entirely self-financ-
ing system for collecting child support if there is the political will." (emphasis in original)). 
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shaped American and European law. She asserts that the development 
of the law has been affected by the fact that the natural rights "theo-
ries were elaborated for [America] by Hobbes and Locke, and for [Eu-
rope] by Rousseau and Kant" (p. 125). American law places a 
"greater emphasis on individual rights," while the civil law system 
gives "more attention to social context and individual responsibility" 
(p. 131). Glendon acknowledges that philosophical ideas are only one 
part of the explanation for the distinctiveness of American law. She 
concentrates her analysis on this explanation because she thinks it has 
not been adequately explored before. 
Glendon also identifies the United States' lack of an explicit na-
tional family policy as one reason for the American difference. Be-
cause American family policy is implicit, in part due to its diverse 
development among the fifty states, it is unexamined. Explicit na-
tional policy is important, Glendon says, because of the symbolic value 
of the recognition of the importance of child raising (p. 135). 
Glendon successfully stimulates thought in three areas in Abortion 
and Divorce in Western Law. First, she forces us to examine our law's 
failure to encourage consensus on abortion. Second, she encourages us 
to question our society's widespread acceptance of no-fault divorce in 
its current form, given its economic consequences for women and chil-
dren. Third, and most importantly, Glendon compels us to reevaluate 
the purpose and role of law in our society. She condemns the view 
that "moral questions are out of bounds, and that the task of law is to 
adapt itself to behavior." Such attitudes, Glendon states, "render in-
sight and self-correction less likely to occur, and lend themselves to 
perpetuation of long cycles of decline. At worst they are counselors of 
nihilism and despair" (p. 140). 
- Sara J. Vance 
